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REFORM OF THE FLORIDA SECURITIES LAW*
JAMES S. MOFSKY**
I. INTRODUCTION
"Consumerism" may be of relatively recent origin with respect to
landlord-tenant law and other areas that are receiving current popular
attention. This concept, however, is not new to securities regulation.
In fact, it dates back to 1911 when the Kansas legislature enacted
the first comprehensive "blue sky" law.' Within the following two
years, 23 states, 2 including Florida, followed the Kansas lead, enacting
laws which, in a majority of cases, were either identical to or based
on the Kansas statute. The Eastern and a few Western states initially
rejected such regulation, but eventually, after World War I, most of
the remaining states succumbed to some form of securities regulation.
After the "crash" of 1929, Congress, finding state regulation inade-
quate for investor protection, enacted the Securities Act of 19333 (one
of the first pieces of "New Deal" legislation) and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.4 These laws did not preempt the area; rather,
they provided for concurrent regulation by the states and the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 5 Later, Congress
enacted additional statutes governing the securities markets. 6 Those
* This article was prepared by the author for the Florida Law Revision Council
to assist the Council in its study of Florida's securities law. The opinions, conclu-
sions and recommendations contained in this article are entirely those of the author
and do not necessarily represent or reflect the opinions, conclusions or recommendations
of the Florida Law Revision Council.
** Professor of Law, University of Miami. B.A., Wesleyan University, 1956; J.D.,
Cornell University, 1959; LL.M., University of Miami, 1966; S.J.D., The George Washing-
ton University, 1971.
1. Kan. Laws 1911, ch. 133. The term "blue sky" was first used to describe the
business practices of promoters and securities salesmen in Kansas at the turn of the
century. The activities of these individuals, it was claimed, bordered on the "sale of
building lots in the blue sky in fee simple." L. Loss & E. CowETr, BLUE SKY LAw 7 n.22
(1958). The legislation intended to prevent such frauds was called blue sky law. Id.
2. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1970).
6. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6
(1970); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb (1970); the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 11 U.S.C. §§ 72, 107; 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -52 (1970);
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laws, as well as amendments to them, 7 have been implemented by far-
reaching rules and interpretations adopted by the SEC.
The blue sky laws, however, have not stood still as federal securi-
ties regulation has proliferated. Indeed, there has been a plethora of
state statutes, amendments, recodifications based on two uniform
acts,8 and a continuous flow of rules and regulations. As recently as
July 1973, a version of the Uniform Securities Act became effective
in Delaware, which for some time had been the last state to resist any
form of blue sky regulation."
Thus securities regulation, unlike other varieties of consumer
protection, has been with us for a long time-never diminishing in
quantity or complexity, instead, spawning a web of greater controls.
It is not difficult to perceive the reasons why this form of "consumer-
ism" took hold so early. At the outset of the Civil War, the United
States Treasury experienced great difficulty selling the bonds necessary
to raise the capital for that enormous undertaking.10 The government
engaged Jay Cooke, who introduced the "Fuller Brush Man" technique
of door-to-door salesmanship to market the bonds throughout the
country. Cooke's salesmen, from all accounts, solicited, and perhaps
harassed, prospective purchasers in every conceivable manner." Follow-
ing the war, the promoters of the transcontinental railroads adopted
Cooke's techniques for retail securities distribution and financed the
country's railroad network, to a large extent, through the stock and
bond purchases of small investors. Many of the investors were farm-
ers and tradesmen who purchased securities on the promise that the
railroad would run through or near their farms. 12 As industrial ventures
were increasingly financed through public solicitation, Cooke's tech-
niques were again followed, and securities salesmen were found travel-
ing the countryside easily unloading stocks and bonds-sometimes
and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1970). Additionally,
Congress has granted the SEC advisory functions in corporate reorganization proceedings
under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970).
7. E.g., the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 78 Stat. 565 (1964), 15 U.S.C. §§
77d, 78c, 78c (note), 781-p, 78t, 78w, 78ff (1970).
8. The Uniform Sale of Securities Act, approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1929, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK AND PROcEEDINGS 171 (1929), and the Uniform Se-
curities Act, approved by that organization in 1956. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COM-
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS 83 (1956).
9. Del. Laws 1973, H.B. No. 416; 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. §§ 11.102-.129 (July 23, 1973).
10. For a more detailed description of these historical matters and for citations to
historical references, see J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY REnTuCTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMO-
TIONS 5-14 (1971). See also L. LoSS & E. COwErr, supra note 1, at 3-10 (1958).
11. See J. MOFSKY, supra note 10, at 8.
12. Id. at 9.
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worthless or heavily watered-during the speculation following the
war.1
At that time there was no regulation, either state or federal, of
the sale of securities, with the exception of futures trading. Although
the amount of losses incurred by investors at that time has never been
calculated, it would not be surprising to find that there were large
losses incurred by many small investors. Similarly, it would not be
surprising to find an amount of fraud commensurate with the wild
times, a period when a national transportation system was built with
incredible speed and when speculation in gold and oil was rampant,
not only among persons who understood such matters, but also among
unsophisticated investors. It has always been unfortunate for many
investors, but nevertheless true, that economic conditions tend to be
cyclical, and the aftermath of the speculation in the early 1900's result-
ed in the panic of 1907.14 Many persons who could ill afford to lose
their hard earned savings suffered severe losses. That panic and its
effects on individuals served as the catalyst to reformers who con-
demned promoters of speculative ventures and investment bankers
as the prime causes of the country's financial reverses. Reformers ad-
vocated regulation of stock exchanges, reform of the federal banking
system and legislation designed to protect investors from the promoters
and salesmen of highly risky securities. The prevailing economic condi-
tions gave rise to emotional responses among the people. That in turn
generated the political climate for what came to be known as
"Populism."
State securities regulation was generated in Kansas at a time when
politicians seeking the favor of agrarian interests advocated the pro-
tection of the common man from American industry's robber barons.
The philosophy underlying that early legislation was emotionally ap-
pealing to a large segment of the populace. The principle of this regu-
lation-sometimes called "merit regulation"-is that state administra-
tors should make official evaluations regarding the degree of riskiness
inherent in a proposed offering, and deny business firms the opportuni-
ty of offering their securities publicly if the risks to investors are deem-
ed too high. Merit regulation exists today in the vast majority of
states, including Florida, and it has been codified in the Uniform Se-
curities Act, which has been enacted, in some form, in a majority of
states.15 That same philosophy was advocated by many persons prior
13. Id.
14. Id. at 10.
15. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
1974]
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to the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, but was ultimately re-
jected on the federal level in favor of the "full" and "fair" disclosure
standard.16
The securities laws-whether of the disclosure or merit variety-
have always been advocated and enacted in the name of "investor pro-
tection. ' ' 17 Anyone arguing against a policy that, on its face, seems so
patently desirable might as well condemn motherhood. The securi-
ties laws, however, have been with us for a considerable period of time,
and to continue blind acceptance of them necessarily results in the
failure to consider important issues that require rigorous analysis. The
fundamental question to be addressed is whether the presumed bene-
fits of Florida's securities laws are in fact being obtained, and, if some
of the benefits do indeed accrue, whether the costs of such regulation
exceed those benefits. In this connection, there are several rhetorical
questions which superficially give rise to simple answers. For example,
is more or less disclosure desirable? Are we in favor of more or less
fraud? Would we rather have greater or fewer losses to investors? The
usual responses to those questions are often given too lightly. Ordinari-
ly, they are offered without consideration of the costs of regulation,
and, if regulation has grown more costly than the benefits it produces,
perhaps it is time to question seriously whether it should be reduced
or, indeed, eliminated entirely. With respect to the question of full
disclosure, it is important to recognize that information, like any other
commodity, is not a costless good, and the current regulatory process
may be generating disclosure in a highly inefficient manner. Further,
much if not all of such disclosure, as now required, may be of little
benefit to investors. Similarly, merit regulation under the blue sky
laws is not a free good and indeed comes very dearly; its effects may
be more detrimental than many persons realize.
One reason these thoughts are not suggested more often is that,
in an age of increasing government paternalism, they are not always
politically popular. Additionally, it is often easier to accept the pat
"consumerism" argument than to subject a highly complex area to
careful analysis.
Moreover, the point can be made with respect to all areas of
government that regulation has the tendency to proliferate ex-
ponentially. In other words, regulation breeds more regulation, and
the costs of regulation increase with the expansion of quantity and
souri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
16. 1 L. Loss, SacuRrrirs REGULATION 122 (2d ed. 1961).
17. See Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YAmE Rav. 521 (1934).
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complexity. This process continues endlessly. As the costs of regulation
increase, the entry barriers to regulated industries or, in the case of
securities regulation, to the capital markets become more formidable,
and fewer firms are able or willing to pay the expenses to compete in
such industries or markets. The anticompetitive effects of regulation
initially adopted for perfectly desirable reasons become onerous as
well as obvious.
Neither the identity nor the number of persons adversely affected
by securities regulation is known with any degree of accuracy, although
regulators and attorneys are aware of isolated situations that come be-
fore them. The fact that the scope of the adversely affected class is un-
known even to its members precludes them from organizing with a
view to announcing their complaints and attempting to remedy their
plight through the political process. For the most part, the regulators
and attorneys specializing in a complex area of regulation develop
vested interests that they will quite naturally defend. For example,
governmental regulators do not willingly give up power. Similarly,
attorneys profit substantially by the myriad regulations through which
they guide their clients. Furthermore, lawyers and most regulators are
not trained to perceive the economic effects of regulation. Thus the
persons who are usually at the forefront of policy formulation are often
unlikely to observe the ramifications of the laws they administer or
to advocate reforms that may be unprofitable to them.
The purpose of this article is to focus on the economic costs of
Florida's securities laws, while at the same time to point out the bene-
fits sought and those actually attained. The tone of this article is in-
tended to differ from that associated with the more traditional litera-
ture in the securities regulation area. This course was chosen to avoid
the arguments that are already well known to persons acquainted with
this field, and because any contribution to reform must be based on a
disciplined form of analysis rather than upon the leap of faith made
regularly by so many market observers. Hopefully, in the light of
such examination, illogical and empirically incorrect justifications for
Florida's securities laws can be isolated. Only then can meaningful re-
form be undertaken. Even if the Legislature is unwilling to enact re-
form along the lines suggested in this article, at least the existing laws
will be retained with a greater realization of their economic and social
costs to Florida.
Before pursuing the more subtle ramifications alluded to above,
it is important to understand how Florida's securities laws compare
with blue sky regulation in general, not so much because comparison
will assist in policy formulation (in fact, it will not), but rather be-
1974]
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cause it will help to illustrate concepts relating to this type of regula-
tion. Therefore, an overview of state securities regulation will be de-
veloped at the outset, and the varieties of such regulation that cur-
rently prevail throughout the states will be categorized. At that point,
the philosophy underlying the varieties of regulation will be stated
uncritically. Next, the Florida law will be introduced and compared
with the statutes and rules of other jurisdictions. The full disclosure
aspects of the Florida law will then be examined both from the point
of view of economic theory and within the context of empirical find-
ings distilled from recent economics literature. That will be followed
by critical analysis of the merit aspects of the Florida law. Finally,
the conclusions developed in the article will be applied to the altema-
tive approaches that might be considered in reforming the laws, and
the opinions and recommendations of the author will be advanced.
II. TYPES OF BLUE SKY REGULATION
At the present time, all states and the District of Columbia have
some form of blue sky law. To some degree, the statutes vary in their
regulatory approaches. They are generally categorized as (a) statutes
regulating securities brokers, dealers, salesmen and investment advisers
through licensing or registration; (b) statutes providing for the regis-
tration of securities; and (c) "fraud" statutes. The laws of several of
the states, however, do not fall into any clear-cut category, but instead
incorporate certain provisions common to each category. For example,
New York commonly has been referred to as the foremost example
of a jurisdiction with a "fraud" variety of blue sky law.18 Yet, New
York also has a broker-dealer registration provision 9 and a statute
requiring the registration of securities issued by firms engaged in real
estate operations. 20 The latter area of regulation grants the New York
Attorney General wide discretion to prevent public offerings of such
issuers.2 1 Additionally, New York law provides for registration, on a
full disclosure basis only, of all securities offered in that state but not
registered under the federal securities laws. This registration require-
ment is, however, inapplicable to securities exempt from federal regis-
tration except those exempted by the intrastate offering exemption.22
18. L. Loss & E. Cowr-r, supra note 1, at 21.
19. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-e (McKinney Supp. 1973); 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. ff 35,
115 (Aug. 5, 1971).
20. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e (McKinney Supp. 1973); 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 35,
102-4 (July 24, 1968).
21. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e (McKinney Supp. 1973); 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. f
35,102-4 (July 24, 1968).
22. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-f (McKinney Supp. 1973); 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. ff
35,116-1 (July 24, 1968).
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Finally, a brief and simple notification must be filed by dealers in
connection with all securities offered publicly in that state.2 8
Like New York, several other states require that securities be
registered with the state government only if not registered federally.
24
For example, the Pennsylvania statute exempts from registration se-
curities that are registered under the Securities Act of 1933.25 Similarly,
the New Jersey statute exempts from registration non-real estate securi-
ties that are registered under the Securities Act of 1933.28 The Nevada
statute applies its registration provisions only to "public intrastate
offerings" (defined to exclude those offerings registered under the Se-
curities Act of 1933 or exempt from registration thereunder other than
by virtue of the federal intrastate offering exemption).
27
The philosophy prompting these rules, peculiar to New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania and Nevada, is that federal regulation is adequate
for investor protection. All other jurisdictions, however, except Con-
necticut and the District of Columbia (where the laws do not require
registration of securities), 2 have laws that necessitate registration with
state authorities even if the securities are also registered under federal
law. Dual registration is intended not only to further ensure full dis-
closure and to prevent fraud but also to facilitate greater protection
of investors by subjecting the securities being offered to state merit
standards.
It is apparent that the standard categorization of blue sky laws
does not hold true in all instances. There are other examples of this
phenomenon, such as regulation of tender offers.29 However, the securi-
ties laws of the vast majority of states have certain common elements
that are both structural and substantive. To some extent, that uni-
formity existed prior to the advent of the Uniform Securities Act in
1956. Nevertheless, the Uniform Securities Act has certainly been a
23. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 359-e (McKinney Supp. 1973); 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 3 35,
115 (Aug. 5, 1971).
24. The New York exemption from registration applies to securities registered
federally either pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 or under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-ff (McKinney Supp. 1973); 2 BLUE SKY L. REP.
35,116-1 (July 24, 1968).
25. Pa. Laws 1972, H.B. No. 1970, § 203(h); 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. % 41,113 (Dec. 18,
1972).
26. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-60 (1970); 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 33,115 (Nov. 15, 1967).
27. NEv. REV. STAT. § 90.075 (1973); 2 BLUE SKY L. Ra'. 1 31,110 (Nov. 19, 1973).
28. Although securities as such need not be registered in those jurisdictions, the
Connecticut and District of Columbia laws contain broker-dealer registration provisions
and antifraud provisions. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-322, 36-338 (1958); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
10,103 (Nov. 19, 1973), 10,119 (April 24, 1973);' D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-2402, 2-2403
(1967); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 12,102, 12,103 (Jan. 25, 1972).
29. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-528 (Supp. 1973); 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. ff 49,228
(March 8, 1971).
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major factor in the increased uniformity of the securities laws in most
of the states. Although the Act has been modified by many legisla-
tures, certain common elements may be found in the statutes of
those states0 where it has been enacted. First, with respect to the
structural similarities, most state securities laws require registration of
broker-dealers, agents and investment advisers. Provisions governing
registration of securities, fraud, civil liabilities and criminal penal-
ties are usually included, in addition to grants of rule-making, de-
finitional and other powers to agencies that administer the securities
laws. With respect to the question of substantive uniformity, the Uni-
form Securities Act, like the statutes in many jurisdictions that have
not adopted the Uniform Act, grants broad rule-making authority to
state administrators, so, while the statutes they administer may be
uniform, the merit and other rules they adopt often vary from state
to state. Additionally, the rules usually have more substantive signifi-
cance in a real-life situation than does the language of a given statute.8'
Thus, although the statutes of most states are structurally and sub-
stantively uniform, the rules often are not. This fact has long been
a major complaint among businessmen and lawyers who plan public
offerings of securities in several states.8 2
As previously mentioned, the main difference between most blue
sky laws and the federal securities laws is that, while the former have
adopted the merit concept, the latter adhere to the full disclosure
philosophy. It is in connection with these merit standards that the
greatest diversity among the states occurs. Merit standards will be
examined in greater detail later in this article. Now, however, the
relationship between the Florida securities law and blue sky regulation
generally will be explored.
III. THE FLORIDA SECURITIES LAW
Florida has not enacted the Uniform Securities Act. Until recent-
ly, the Florida statute was entitled the "Uniform Sale of Securities
Law," inasmuch as certain provisions of the statute were modeled
after the Uniform Sale of Securities Law. This uniform law was never
widely adopted and eventually was stricken from the list of approved
laws by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
30. For a list of those jurisdictions where the Act has been enacted, in whole or
with modifications, see note 15 supra.
31. This is because the statutes generally contain broad standards and grant
state administrators wide discretion to adopt rules that specify, usually in quantitative
terms, the basis on which securities will qualify for registration.
32. See, e.g., Gray, Blue Sky Practice-A Morass?, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1519 (1969).
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Laws.3 3 Since its enactment in a form based on the first uniform law,
the Florida statute has undergone periodic changes. Today, the Florida
statute differs substantially in many respects from the Uniform Sale
of Securities Act, the Uniform Securities Act and the statutes of most
other states. Similarly, the rules adopted by the Florida Division of
Securities differ in material respects from the rules of many other
states. The basic structure of the Florida statute, however, in common
with the laws of other states, includes anti-fraud provisions and pro-
visions relating to registration of securities and registration of dealers,
salesmen and investment advisers.
3 4
Although it might be an interesting academic exercise to itemize
all the similarities and differences between the Florida law and the
Uniform Securities Act, that process would be fruitless in assessing
the desirability of retaining the present law or adopting some other
statute, such as the Uniform Securities Act. To be sure, it would simpli-
fy this author's task to advocate uniformity for its own sake. Most
other states3 5 seem to have done just that, as did the drafters of the
Uniform Act.36 Uniformity does indeed have some virtues.3 7 For
example, it simplifies many of the procedural aspects of meeting blue
sky regulations for a particular issue and of registering dealers, sales-
men and investment advisers.38 In that respect, uniformity has the de-
sirable effect of lowering the transaction costs associated with such
matters. But aside from those savings, which are probably small com-
pared with the high costs related to full disclosure and merit regula-
tion generally, uniformity in itself has few other virtues, especially
since the administrative rules adopted by the Uniform Act jurisdictions
are not themselves uniform.
If the kind of analysis suggested in the introduction to this paper
were applied to the Uniform Act and if the benefits of that law were
33. The Act was adopted by Louisiana and Hawaii, and, with modifications, by
Alabama, Florida, Michigan, Oregon and South Carolina. Subsequently, the Act
was either repealed or substantially modified in those states. In several of those states,
the Act was replaced by the Uniform Securities Act. The Uniform Sale of Securities Act
was stricken by the Conference from its list of approved acts in 1944. NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS 233
(1944).
34. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.07, 517.301 (1971); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. Hf 13,107 (June 19,
1973), 13,130 (Sept. 18, 1972); Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 68, § 3, amending FLA. STAT. § 517.12
(Supp. 1972); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 13,112 (June 19, 1973).
35. See note 15 supra.
36. The drafters of the Uniform Securities Act did not undertake a study of the
desirability of mandatory disclosure, merit standards or for that matter any other
policy considerations underlying state securities regulation. See L. Loss & E. CowErr,
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found to exceed the costs it produces, there would be no difficulty in
recommending adoption in Florida of that act. However, no such
analysis has been done, and, even if it were, the results would probably
not differ very much from those derived from a similar analysis of
the current Florida statute, since at the heart of both laws are the
disclosure and merit requirements. Therefore, the next several por-
tions of this article will focus primarily on the disclosure and merit
aspects of the Florida law, although comparison of Florida law with
statutes and rules of other states will be made whenever it is useful to
illustrate particular concepts.
IV. REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES IN FLORIDA
A principal regulatory feature of the Florida Sale of Securities
Law39 is that no securities, except those exempt or sold in exempt
transactions, may be offered for sale in Florida unless they are register-
ed.4 0 Registration entails the filing and processing of certain prescribed
documents 41 with the Division of Securities,42  the agency that
examines those documents to ascertain whether the securities and the
firms offering them meet the disclosure and merit standards created
by the Florida statute and the Division's rules. If the securities and
the issuer meet those standards, the registration becomes effective
or a license is issued, depending on the method by which the securities
are registered.4 3 At that point, the securities may be sold publicly. If
the securities or issuer fail to comply with those standards, however,
the Division of Securities is empowered to deny or suspend effective-
ness of registration statements or to revoke registrations.4
There are three techniques by which securities may be registered
in Florida: (a) coordination;45 (b) qualification;"6 and (c) announce-
ment.4? Before discussing those processes in greater detail, it is im-
39. FLA. STAT. ch. 517 (1971), as amended, Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-68; 1 BLUE SKY
L. REP. 77 13,101-12 (June 19, 1973), 13,113-34 (Sept. 18, 1972).
40. FLA. STAT. § 517.07 (1971); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 13,107 (June 19, 1973).
41. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.08(2), 517.09(3) (1971); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 77 13,108-09
(June 19, 1973). See also FLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3B-1.02 to .03, 3B-2.01 to .02, 3B-2.07; 1 BLUE
SKY L. REP. §11 13,602-03, 13,631-32 (Sept. 8, 1972), 13,637 (May 22, 1973).
42. The Division of Securities is a division of the Department of Banking and
Finance, which has the statutory mandate of administering and enforcing Florida
securities law. See FLA. STAT. § 517.03 (1971); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 13,103 (June 19, 1973).
43. FLA. STAT. § 517.09 (1971); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 13,109 (June 19, 1973); FLA.
STAT. § 517.08 (Supp. 1972); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 13,108 (June 19, 1973).
44. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.08(4), 517.09(7), 517.11 (1971); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 77 13,108-09,
13,111 (June 19, 1973).
45. FLA. STAT. § 517.08 (Supp. 1972); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 13,108 (June 19, 1973).
46. FLA. STAT. § 517.09 (1971); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. f 13,109 (June 19, 1973).
47. FLA. STAT. § 517.091 (1971); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. ff 13,109-1 (June 19, 1973).
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portant to point out that registration, regardless of the technique used,
is required only in the event that securities are offered for sale and
there is no exemption from registration applicable either to the se-
curities themselves or to the transaction in which they are offered.
Thus questions involving the definitions of "security
' ' 48 and "sale," 49
as well as the possible exemptions available, 50 are threshold considera-
tions that lawyers must resolve before considering the appropriate
form of registration for a given offering. If a security is in fact being
offered for sale and no exemption from registration is available, the
differences among those three registration techniques become
significant.
Registration by coordination, unlike its namesake under the Uni-
form Securities Act,51 is limited in Florida to firms that have established
successful business records. To qualify for this form of registration in
Florida, a firm must show that it has been in continuous business
operation for a period of not less than three years.5 2 Additionally, a
firm must demonstrate net earnings for each of its last two fiscal years
of not less than $100,000, as well as no material change in its opera-
tions that would indicate net earnings less than $100,000 for its current
fiscal year.53 If a firm has senior securities outstanding any default-in
48. The definition of "security" has been expanded recently to include many
financing devices that were not in the past generally regarded as securities. This
expansion has occurred in connection with the catchall terms "investment contract,"
"interests in or under a profit-sharing or participation agreement or scheme" and
"any other instrument commonly known as a security." See FLA. STAT. § 517.02(1)
(1971); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 13,102 (June 19, 1973). For a description of judicial and
legislative expansion of those terms, see Mofsky, The Expanding Definition of "Security"
Under the Blue Sky Laws, 1 SEC. REG. L.J. 217 (1973). The judicial application of
these terms to a wide variety of financing devices has not been done by means of any
clear-cut definition of the terms. Accordingly, there is considerable uncertainty in many
states, including Florida, with respect to the question of whether a particular plan of
financing constitutes a security. Cases contributing to that uncertainty in Florida
include Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970); Bond v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 276 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Frye v.
Taylor, 263 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Bond v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., 246 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v.
Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969), afJ'd, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970).
49. FLA. STAT. § 517.02(3) (1971); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 9 13,102 (June 19, 1973).
50. Exempt securities are enumerated in FLA. STAT. § 517.05 (1971); 1 BLUE SKY L.
RaP. 13,105 (June 19, 1973). Exempt transactions are set forth in FLA. STAT. § 517.06
'(1971), as amended, Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-68, § 2; 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 13,106 (June 19,
1973). For charts compiling and comparing the exempt securities and exempt transac-
tions provisions of all the states, see J. MOFSKY, supra note 10, at 114-61.
51. See UNIFOPM SECuuriEs Acr § 303; 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 4923 (Dec. 20, 1971).
52. FLA. STAT. § 517.08(l)(b) (Supp. 1972); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. ff 13,108 (June 19,
1973).
53. FLA. STAT. § 517.08(l)(d) (Supp. 1972); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. V 13,108 (June 19,
1973).
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interest, dividend or principal payments on such securities in the pres-
ent or the two preceeding years-will disqualify the issuer from use
of this form of registration. 54 Finally, offerings registered by coordina-
tion must be supported by firm commitments from underwriters55
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,56 unless the se-
curities being registered are offered in exchange for the securities of
another issuer. The only prerequisite for using the Florida coordina-
tion procedure that remotely resembles the requirements in the
analogous Uniform Securities Act procedure is the requirement that
a registration statement covering the securities, prepared in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933,5 7 must be filed
with the SEC.
The purpose behind the coordination procedure of the Uniform
Act is to lower the transactions costs of registration by permitting filing
with state administrators of essentially the same documents that are
filed with the SEC and by permitting registration with the SEC and
state agencies to become effective simultaneously.58 Although the Uni-
form Act jurisdictions may impose their respective merit standards
on promotional or other speculative companies, those coordination
benefits are available to all issuers that register securities with the
SEC. The coordination procedure in Florida, however, precludes its
use by start-up or promotional firms or even older businesses that
have had earnings below the requisite amount during the two years
prior to filing. The obvious economic ramification of the Florida co-
ordination procedure is to create a competitive advantage for larger,
older firms over newer, less profitable ones, since firms that do not
qualify for the Florida coordination technique must use the more
costly method made available by the statute-registration by qualifica-
tion.59
The registration by qualification procedure is more costly because,
unlike the coordination method, the registration in Florida does not
become effective concurrently with SEC effectiveness. Accordingly,
lawyers must spend time and effort coordinating Florida and SEC
54. FLA. STAT. § 517.08(1)(c) (Supp. 1972); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. f1 13,108 (June 19,
1973).
55. FLA. STAT. § 517.08(1)(a) (Supp. 1972); 1 BLUE SKY L. R.EP. ff 13,108 (June 19,
1973).
56. FLA. STAT. § 517.08(1)(a) (Supp. 1972); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. ff 13,108 (June 19,
1973).
57. FLA. STAT. § 517.08(1) (Supp. 1972); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 9 13,108 Uune 19,
1973).
58. See UNIFORM SECuluTiEs Acr § 303, Official Comment, in L. Loss & E. Cowa-r,
supra note 1, at 294-95.
59. FLA. STAT. § 517.09 (1971); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 13,109 (June 19, 1973).
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effectiveness; that work by lawyers raises costs. Such coordination takes
place automatically under the provisions permitting registration by
coordination. Similarly, more complex documents, completed at great-
er cost, must be filed when securities are registered by qualification.0
Yet those greater costs associated with registration by qualification
do not yield commensurate benefits. Registration by coordination
under the Uniform Securities Act can be used by any issuer that also
registers securities with the SEC pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933,
and the merit standards of those Uniform Act states nevertheless
apply. But in Florida, merit standards (earnings history, etc.) are pre-
requisites for the use of registration by coordination. Aside from the
desirability of merit standards at all, it seems clear that all firms-new
or old, profitable or unprofitable-ought to have equal access to the
same registration processes, especially since merit standards can be
made applicable to securities regardless of the method by which they
are registered.
The third technique for registering securities-registration by an-
nouncement 61-is unavailable to an issuer for purposes of raising capital.
Its use is restricted solely to registering shares that are already out-
standing and have been in the hands of the public for not less than
one year. The securities statute of only one other state contains a
registration by announcement provision. 62 Since there are many exemp-
tions for after-market trading in Florida6 3 and since registration by an-
nouncement is of no beneficial use for a firm in raising capital and
only of very little consequence with respect to registering outstanding
securities, 64 further discussion of it is of little benefit. Suffice it to say
that the provision continues as a vestige of earlier law. In any event,
that exemption, even in theory, is at best anomalous, since the Florida
Division of Securities does not have the financial capacity and man-
power to police and enforce the registration of securities that are
already in the hands of the public but neither registered nor exempt
from registration in Florida.65 The costs of creating a mechanism to
60. See the requirements for forms prescribed by the Florida Division of Securities
in FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 3B-2.01; 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. ff 13,631 (Sept. 8, 1972).
61. FLA. STAT. § 517.091 (1971); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. ff 13,109-1 (June 19, 1973).
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-07.01 (Supp. 1973); 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. § 37,107-1
(Mar. 27, 1973).
63. See FLA. STAT. § 517.06 (1971), as amended, Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-68, § 2; 1 BLUE
SKY L. REP. ff 13,106 (June 19, 1973).
64. These conclusions are derived from the restrictions contained in the statutory
provision and, additionally, are based on the registration requirements imposed by the
statute. See FLA. STAT. § 517.091 (1971); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 13,109-1 (June 19, 1973).
65. An enforcement team of enormous proportions would be required to detect
those securities that are already outstanding but not exempt. Constant surveillance
of all aspects of the securities markets would be necessary to accomplish the result.
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enforce registration in this context are extremely high-far higher than
any benefits imaginable.66
Thus far, the three registration techniques included in the Florida
statute have been described, and the more obvious technical aspects
have been criticized. But no consideration has been given to the funda-
mental issues underlying the registration process: (a) the objectives
that registration is intended to accomplish; (b) the extent to which
those objectives are in fact accomplished; and (c) if some or all of
those objectives are indeed achieved, the extent to which the benefits
emanating from them exceed the costs of their production. The im-
port of these issues has already been raised; it goes to the very policies
that are at the core of the registration process.
Basically, there are three objectives underlying registration re-
quirements: first, to provide disclosure to investors of certain specified
information regarding the issuer and its securities; 61 secondly, to limit
the incidence of fraud, through governmental supervision of the dis-
closure process; 6 and finally, to provide information from which the
Florida Division of Securities or its counterpart in other jurisdictions
may determine whether offerings meet the Florida or other state
merit standards.6 9 The first and second objectives are identical to those
underlying the disclosure requirements of the federal securities
laws;7 0 the third, however, as previously indicated, was rejected on the
federal level and is unique to the states.
Although the disclosure aspects of blue sky regulation have not
been examined from the standpoint of their implicit and explicit
costs and benefits, certain disclosure provisions of the federal securities
laws have been subjected to analysis by professional economists. By
analogy, that analysis is useful in assessing the degree to which the dis-
closure provisions of the blue sky laws-and Florida's in particular-
have, on balance, proved beneficial. Indeed, since the disclosure re-
quirements of the state laws and those adopted under the Securities
Act of 1933 are very similar, it is probably correct to predict that an
empirical economic study of the disclosure aspects of the state laws
would yield results essentially symmetrical to those already obtained
in connection with the Securities Act of 1933.
There have been no empirical economic studies of the merit pro-
visions of blue sky laws, and since the federal securities laws, with a
66. See note 65 supra.
67. See J. MoFsKY, supra note 10, at 19.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 121-28 (2d ed. 1961); Sowards, The
Federal Securities Act, in 11 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 1.02 (1973).
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few very specialized exceptions, 71 were not enacted with the intention
that they regulate the merits of securities offerings, the existing
economic analysis of federal regulation will not help us with respect
to assessing the effects of merit regulation. Accordingly, any economic
analysis in this article of the merit aspects of the Florida securities law
must, of necessity, be limited to theoretical inquiry. But that limita-
tion does not render such analysis of the merit standards worthless. In
fact, the theoretically derived ramifications of the merit standards
seem to be very persuasive indicia of the adverse effects those regula-
tions probably have in the securities markets, particularly in connec-
tion with the public promotion of new ventures and the public sale
of small offerings.
V. THE DESIRABILITY OF MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE STANDARDS
Everyone acquainted with securities regulation, at both the federal
and state levels, is aware that the disclosure system requires the pro-
duction of information that is processed by governmental authorities,
distributed on various levels and ultimately disseminated to the public.
But it is often forgotten or perhaps never really understood that in-
formation is not a free good and that the production of the information
required by the disclosure rules involves substantial costs. These
costs include direct expenses such as attorneys', accountants', printers'
and filing fees as well as the salaries of corporate employees whose
time is allocated to assisting in the preparation of disclosure docu-
ments rather than to other corporate affairs.7 2 Additionally, there are
indirect costs such as delays in selling the securities. These costs are
generated by the need to gather information, verify its accuracy, put
it in the form required by the governing agency, wait for that agency
to respond with its deficiency comments and amend the disclosure
documents in response to those comments. In some cases this entire
process might be repeated one or more times in connection with a
single offering.
71. Examples of those few exceptions are the merit standards contained in the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 11 U.S.C. §§ 72, 107; 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52
(1970). Although the federal securities laws were not generally enacted to regulate
the merits of public offerings of securities, the manner in which the full disclosure
laws have been administered has given rise to federal administrative procedures that
are indeed merit-like in effect.
72. For a comprehensive discussion of the costs of a public offering, see Wheat &
Blackstone, Guideposts for a First Public Offering, 15 Bus. LAWYER 539 (1960);
Blackstone, Post-effective Amendment to "Guideposts for a First Public Offering," in
SELEcTED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL SECURITmS LAW 27 (H. Wander & W. Grienenberger
eds. 1968).
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Other indirect costs include the expense to a firm of divulging in-
formation to competitors and the cost of misinformation that may
occur if investors accept the disclosed information as accurately re-
flecting the financial condition of a business enterprise when in fact
it may not. One example of an indirect cost is that resulting from the
conservative accounting bias of the SEC and state rules that preclude
disclosure in financial statements of appreciated assets at their fair
market value.73 One could easily list many other direct and indirect
costs associated with disclosure. To belabor that analysis is unnecessary,
however, if it is recognized that the benefits of disclosure should not be
viewed in a vacuum, separated from the costs associated with it.
If there were no legal requirements forcing disclosure according
to specified standards, voluntary disclosure might nevertheless be
undertaken by corporate executives, if one can assume that such per-
sons would act in the best interests of shareholders. Given that assump-
tion, corporate officials would provide information to investors if
the marginal benefits of the information to investors equaled the cost
of its production to the corporation. Such a result would be consistent
with the general rule that the efficient allocation of resources in the
economy is optimized when marginal costs are equated with marginal
benefits. 74
Corporate managers may withhold some information if they believe
that the benefits to shareholders would be lessened as a result of making
such information available to competitors. Similarly, corporate officials
may decide that certain disclosure would mislead investors, causing
them to make unwarranted investment decisions. However, if informa-
tion were not disclosed voluntarily, investors would be free to purchase
it in the market place just as they might buy any other commodity.
Experience in other areas75 shows that an open market for information
services is feasible, and there is no reason to believe that it would
fail to develop here. To some extent, that market exists today through
the activities of securities dealers, mutual funds and the many invest-
ment services.
Additionally, although the enforcement costs would be high, share-
holders-under common law principles and by state statutes-have
some rights to inspect the books and records of corporations in which
they own shares."6 It is also true that courts, in the past, have not grant-
73. See Benston, The Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44
ACCOUNTING REV. 515 (1969).
74. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNiVrIrY ECONOMICS 389-93 (3d ed. 1972).
75. E.g., various periodicals describing, comparing and assessing consumer products
have been published for years.
76. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 608.39 (1971). See N. LATrIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
344-52 (2d ed. 1971).
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ed those rights liberally. Based upon the changing climate regarding
corporate social responsibility and duties to shareholders, courts might
now grant those rights more freely in the absence of mandatory dis-
closure administered by government agencies.
In the foregoing theoretical perspective, corporate officials would
be assessing marginal costs and benefits in determining the amount
and kind of disclosure to make. If such officials did not make volun-
tary disclosure, investors and others who wanted undisclosed informa-
tion would be forced to bear the costs of obtaining it. That proposition
should not seem unfair or unreasonable. In other areas, it has long
been considered quite acceptable that persons who receive benefits
should pay the accompanying costs. These conclusions are based on
the assumption that corporate officials would adopt behavior designed
to maximize the market value of their corporations' outstanding stock.
Such behavior, in turn, would have the desirable effect of maximizing
shareholder wealth. If that assumption and the above analysis are
accurate, disclosure forced by a government agency would be more
damaging than beneficial to shareholder wealth.
The conclusions derived from this analysis fail if the fundamental
assumption regarding the behavior of corporate managers is wrong.
For example, corporate officials might be deceitful. In fact, they might
steal corporate assets and hide their larcenous behavior by refusing
to disclose their corporations' true financial conditions. Furthermore,
for a variety of selfish reasons, they might disclose misleading or un-
true information that would cause losses to investors. Additionally,
apart from any question of intentional dishonesty, corporate officers
might simply miscalculate the marginal benefits of disclosure to the
stockholders and the marginal costs of its production to the corporation.
Although one could argue that these activities would be exposed by
the information gathered and sold by private investment services, it is
conceivable that management could undertake a variety of activities
that might raise the costs of gathering information by private services.
That behavior would result in increasing the costs of information to
shareholders without the accompanying benefit of decreasing the costs
to corporations. There is a final argument in favor of the current dis-
closure system that many advocate with great vigor: "investor confi-
dence" in the information required by and processed with govern-
ment agencies. This argument is based on the notion that, absent
mandatory disclosure, members of the public would cease investing
in American industry to the eventual damage of the entire economic
system."
77. See Manne, Sins of Commission-A New Study Challenges SEC Disclosure
Policies, Barron's, Aug. 20, 1978, at 8, col. 4.
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Thus there are theoretical arguments that can be advanced for
and against mandatory disclosure, depending on the assumptions one
is willing to make. Fortunately, however, some empirical evidence has
been carefully gathered from which inferences may be drawn regarding
the costs and benefits of forced disclosure. In his recent article evaluat-
ing the accounting disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Professor Benston analyzed all the arguments in favor of
the accounting disclosure requirements of that law and, after detailed
statistical testing, concluded that they have had "no measurable
positive effect on the securities traded on the New York Stock Ex-
change. There appears to have been little basis for the legislation and
no evidence that it was needed or desirable. ' '7 Before describing those
arguments and Benston's findings in greater detail, it is worthwhile
to note the statistics regarding voluntary disclosure prior to the require-
ments of the federal law. Benston found that a large majority of the
corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange had previously
made public much of the financial disclosure material that was ul-
timately required by the 1934 Act. For example, for the year ended
December 1933, all Big Board listed corporations were audited by
CPA firms, all reported current assets and liabilities in their balance
sheets, 93 percent disclosed depreciation expenses, 62 percent reported
sales and 54 percent disclosed the cost of goods sold.7 9 Furthermore,
these percentages had been increasing steadily throughout most of the
1920's.80
Thus there are empirical findings to support the theoretical argu-
ment for voluntary disclosure discussed above. But Benston went well
beyond that proposition and amassed a large body of data that he
used to test the correctness of the main reasons advocated in favor of
mandatory disclosure. The first argument examined-that forced dis-
closure is necessary to prevent fraud and manipulation-was found to
have little empirical basis. Examining the available literature, includ-
ing hearings in both houses of Congress on the proposed legislation,
Benston discovered very little evidence of fraud in financial state-
ments. Furthermore, the recent BarChris, Yale Transport, Green De-
partment Store, Continental Vending and Equity Funding debacles
strongly indicate the fact that forced disclosure, even under the rules
of the SEC and state securities commissions, has not eliminated the
problem of fraud and manipulation. First of all, the current manda-
tory disclosure rules do not require independent accountants to audit
78. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 153 (1973).




for fraud.81 But even if such a rule were adopted, it could not banish
fraudulent disclosure. Nothing short of policemen-assuming they are
incorruptible (an assumption few persons would be willing to make)-
looking over the shoulders of businessmen and accountants could
remedy the fraud problem, and few persons would be willing to pay
the costs associated with that kind of system.
Although Benston's findings indicate little evidence that corpora-
tions issued fraudulent financial statements prior to the enactment of
the federal securities laws, the SEC has asserted that failure to disclose
reliable information facilitated fraudulent activity by providing the
tools through which manipulators organized massive pool operations.
These pool operations were, in turn, used to manipulate stock prices.
8 2
To test that allegation, Benston examined the financial statements of
over one hundred corporations (whose securities were subject to
pools according to the Senate Banking and Currency Committee) for
years before, during and after the pools. He found that the percentage
of corporations involved in pool operations and making disclosure was
practically the same as the percentage of corporations involved in pool
operations and not making disclosure. 3 Thus, regardless of any claim
that pool operations were damaging to investors, their existence was
not caused by the nondisclosure of financial information.
84
Another rationale offered by the SEC for mandatory disclosure is
that it permits "investors [to] make realistic appraisal of the merits of
securities and thus exercise an informed judgment in determining
whether to purchase them."8 5 This argument is based, first, on the
belief that the disclosure required by the SEC provides information
that affects investor expectations regarding the future prospects of a
firm and, secondly, that the information is distributed to investors be-
fore it has been fully discounted in the market price. 6 If the informa-
tion required by the 1934 Act meets the foregoing two criteria, then it
should have an effect on market prices during the period when the
information is disclosed publicly according to the SEC rules. To test
this hypothesis, Benston computed a lengthy series of regressions deal-
ing with accounting data for the months when such data were filed
with the SEC and for the months when earnings were actually an-
nounced publicly, usually a month before the earnings reports are
81. Id. at 135.
82. SEC, A 25 YER SUMMARY OF THE AcrimS OF THE SECURITIES AN EXCHANGE
COMMISSION pts. XV-XVI (1959).
83. Benston, supra note 78, at 136.
84. Id.
85. SEC, THE WORK OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1 (1967).
86. BENSTON, supra note 78, at 137,
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sent to the SEC."' The findings are extremely damaging to the manda-
tory disclosure argument. To quote Benston's conclusion: "On the
average, a one hundred percent unexpected increase (or decrease) in
the rate of change of income is associated with a 2 percent increase (or
decrease) in the rate of change of stock prices in the month of announce-
ment.""" Using different techniques, other economists have established
corroborative findings.8 9 In other words, mandatory disclosure pro-
cessed with the SEC has minimal impact on investor behavior.
Two possible reasons have been advanced for this result: either the
required disclosure is meaningless or stale, or insiders are not being
prevented from trading on the information prior to its disclosure.90
Professor Manne has argued that there is a strong implication of the
latter situation with respect to most price movements.91 His argu-
ment, for which there is indirect empirical support,92 is that much of
the value of material information is being discounted in stock prices
prior to public disclosure because of the trading of insiders who
have access to that information. In any event, it seems clear that the
mandatory disclosure provisions of the federal securities laws have not
benefited outside investors.
The final argument analyzed by Professor Benston is that manda-
tory disclosure creates investor confidence in the information received
and, therefore, in the securities market itself. To test this hypothesis,
he equates investor confidence with the riskiness of returns from se-
curities. If mandatory disclosure did indeed reduce risk to investors,
there would then be tangible evidence of beneficial results emanating
from that aspect of the securities laws.93 Although disclosure in itself
does not eliminate all risk, it could reduce the risk of investors failing
to know of material information; such a reduction would, in turn,
cause them to behave in ways that would change market prices con-
sistent with the nature of the particular information disclosed man-
datorily. With respect to corporations disclosing accounting data prior
to the 1934 Act and those not disclosing such data, Benston found
the degree of risk to be about the same.94 Moreover, in connection
with companies engaged in industries whose accounting policies were
87. Id. at 137-40.
88. Id. at 139.
89. Ball & Brown, An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers, 6 J.
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 159 (1968).
90. See Manne, supra note 77, at 7, col. 4.
91. Id. See also H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 77-105 (1966).
92. Lorie & Niederhoffer, Predictive and Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11
J. LAw & ECON. 35 (1968).
93. BENSTON, supra note 78, at 150.
94. Id. at 151.
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severely affected by the conservative accounting principles forced on
independent accountants by the SEC, less information was in fact dis-
closed to investors after enactment of the 1934 Act.95 Thus there is
evidence that the disclosure requirements of the Act have had a dys-
functional effect on the market.
It is interesting to hear so many statements in 1974 that investor
confidence has been lost and that its re-creation is necessary before
investors (particularly small ones) will return to the stock market.
These assertions are heard forty years after the mandatory disclosure
laws were enacted. During those four decades, the disclosure require-
ments have become more complex, pervasive and detailed. If investor
confidence is now at such a low ebb, how can one continue to maintain
that it is promoted by mandatory disclosure? There has certainly been
sufficient time to develop disclosure standards that would do the job,
if in fact there were some correlation between mandatory disclosure
and investor confidence. What the proponents of the investor confi-
dence argument fail to realize is that stock losses alone diminished in-
vestor confidence. During bear market periods since 1933, the investor
confidence argument was probably always raised, although it was proba-
bly seldom advanced when stock prices were rising.
Thus far only the empirical findings developed in connection with
the 1934 Act disclosure requirements have been considered. However,
data and conclusions have also been gathered and drawn with respect
to the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. Professor
Stigler, in the first economic work testing the effectiveness of the dis-
closure aspects of the federal securities laws,9 6 measured the success of
investors by comparing the five-year performance for all new issues of
industrial stock of a certain value issued before the 1933 Act (1923-
28) with the five-year performance of all new issues of industrial
stocks of a certain value issued after the effectiveness of that act (1949-
55). After correction by critics of Stigler's methodology,97 the data
indicate practically no difference in the relative market values of the
new issues studied in the pre- and post-1933 Act periods.98 Thus Stigler
concluded that the disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act seem to
be of only little significance to investors.99
There is substantial evidence that the costs associated with the dis-
closure requirements of the 1933 Act have channeled debt issues from
95. Id.
96. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964).
97. Friend & Herman, The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382 (1964).
Stigler corrected his work after the Friend and Herman commentary. See Stigler. Com-
ment, 37 J. Bus. 414 (1964).
98. See Stigler, supra note 97.
99. See Stigler, supra note 96; Stigler, supra note 97,
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the public to the private market.100 Regardless of whether one views
this as socially desirable, it clearly was not a consequence intended by
the members of Congress whose objective was an increased public
participation in securities ownership. 10 But this result is highly un-
desirable aside from the expectations of legislators. The restrictions
inherent in the private placement exemption severely limit, among
other things, the identity of persons to whom securities may be offered,
absent registration under the 1933 Act. 0 2 Banks, insurance companies,
other financial institutions, and other more affluent investors who meet
the identity requirements of the exemption have, because of the dis-
closure costs connected with 1933 Act registration, been granted a
competitive advantage over less affluent investors in purchasing se-
curities in the private market.03
Additionally, there are economic studies dealing with the perform-
ance of mutual funds. These studies warrant consideration since mu-
tual funds have staffs of experts who spend their professional careers
analyzing financial information. To the extent that mutual funds use
information disclosed in 1934 Act reports or 1933 Act prospectuses, it
is doubtful that such information is used economically, since none of
the published studies indicates that mutual funds, on the average, have
been able to outperform the market 0 4 Therefore, highly sophisticated
users of information that is mandatorily disclosed do not seem to profit
from such information, unless mutual fund managers exploit valuable
information for their personal benefit rather than for the benefit of
fund shareholders, or unless other skilled persons are able to analyze
information and use it faster than fund managers. In either event, the
nonprofessional investor would clearly get the mandatorily disclosed
information too late for it to be of any value to him.
For purposes of this article, it is unnecessary to elaborate further
the findings of economists concerning the costs and benefits of dis-
closure under the federal securities laws. While it is true that compli-
cated statistical research is always prone to errors in methodology or
100. See Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure
Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23-
79 (H. Manne ed. 1969) and the authorities collected in that article.
101. See authorities cited in Benston, supra note 100, at 76.
102. For a current discussion of the federal private placement exemption, see Sowards,
The Federal Securities Act, in 11 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.02 (1973).
103. That advantage may increase if proposed rule 146 is adopted. That proposed
rule contains identity restrictions that could be more severe than those recognized under
current judicial and administrative interpretations of the private placement exemption.
See SEC, Securities Act Release No. 5336 (Nov. 28, 1972), as amended, No. 5430 (Oct.
10, 1973).
104. See authorities cited in Benston, supra note 100, at 76.
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computation, the results mentioned should at least make one question
whether the existing federal disclosure system is generating benefits
commensurate with its costs. And if one is suspicious of the effects of
that system, he ought to be doubly concerned with assertions that there
are net benefits emanating from disclosure on the state level. The
Florida Division of Securities does not have the financial resources or
manpower to operate as efficiently as the SEC. Accordingly, if results
of the SEC's activities are open to serious question, one can hardly
continue to presume that disclosure via the Florida Division of Securi-
ties is worth its price.
In any event, there appears to be little justification for mandatory
disclosure to both the SEC and the Florida Division of Securities, es-
pecially since less information must be divulged under the Florida
rules than under SEC regulations.1 5 Therefore, the elimination of the
registration requirements in Florida for firms that either register se-
curities under the Securities Act of 1933 or those that report periodical-
ly under the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is
recommended. As indicated earlier in this article, there is precedent
for that type of exemption in other states, 10 and there is no evidence
of greater losses to investors in those jurisdictions than there is to
Florida investors. This recommendation should not be disconcerting
in view of the economic data described in connection with the manda-
tory disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws. If Florida
is to retain any system of mandatory disclosure (and for the reasons al-
ready advanced, it is questionable whether it should), such a system
should apply only to those securities not registered federally and those
not exempted because of the private nature of the offering or for
some other policy reason. Specific recommendations regarding types of
exemption are made at the conclusion of this article.
There is one final matter that must be dealt with at this juncture.
Registration of securities in Florida has, it must be remembered, three
purposes: (a) full disclosure; (b) prevention of fraud; and (c) appli-
cation of the Florida merit standards. The applicability of registration
to full disclosure and fraud has already been discussed. Before present-
ing final conclusions regarding the registration aspects of the Florida
securities law, the ramifications of the Florida merit standards will
be considered.
105. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 3B-202(c) (1972); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 13,632 (Sept. 8,
1972).
106. See the New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Nevada statutes cited in notes
22, 25-27 supra.
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VI. THE FLORIDA MERIT STANDARDS
The concept of merit regulation is that state administrators should
make official evaluations regarding the degree of risk inherent in a
proposed offering, and deny business firms the opportunity to offer
their securities publicly if the risk to prospective investors is deemed
too high. Although such judgments are often made on the basis of ad
hoc and informal rules, efforts to simplify the administrative task
have led to the adoption of formal rules with respect to various aspects
of a proposed securities issue.
Many of these explicit, published rules are directed exclusively at
the public offerings of newly promoted ventures, since such businesses
are often organized around an idea or invention of disputable value
and are therefore, by nature, highly risky. Although other formal
rules are by their terms applicable to all firms seeking to enter the
capital market, some assume significance only in connection with
specific types of ventures or offerings. For example, most states have
generally applicable rules limiting the amount of underwriters' com-
pensation and other expenses that may be paid by firms attempting to
raise capital publicly. Such restrictions have little, if any, real effect
on established businesses seeking substantial amounts of capital; the
impact of the rules is felt almost entirely by small businesses or new
ventures attempting to finance operations with relatively small amounts
of capital.
The blue sky statutes of most states contain provisions granting ad-
ministrators the authority to regulate the expenses of public offer-
ings.107 Pursuant to those statutory provisions, administrators have
adopted rules that quantify the maximum expenses that may be in-
curred in connection with public offerings of securities.108 In Florida,
there are specific statutory provisions regarding the expenses that may
be incurred in registered offerings. Both registration by coordination
and registration by qualification provisions limit the discounts, com-
missions, expenses, remuneration and other compensation to an
amount not in excess of 20 percent of the value of the securities offered
in Florida.10 9 Rules in other states quantify expense limitations to
amounts ranging from 15 to 20 percent of the aggregate value of securi-
ties offered.1 0
The benefits sought from this form of regulation are clear. As
107. For a collection of those statutes and citations to them, see Mofsky, Adverse
Consequences oj Blue Sky Regulation of Public Offering Expenses, 1972 Ws. L. Rrv. 1010.
108. For a collection of those rules, see id.
109. See notes 45 & 46 supra.
110. Mofsky, supra note 107, at 1011-15.
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previously noted, the concept underlying merit regulation is that ad-
ministrators should make judgments regarding the degree of risk
inherent in a proposed offering and stop issues from coming to market
if the risks to investors are deemed too high. Restrictions on the ex-
pense of nonexempt offerings are designed to limit investors' risk by
preventing dilution of the public's investment beyond some fixed
point. To the extent that expenses of offerings might be higher in
the absence of regulation, these limitations have had their desired
effect. Before concluding that such regulation should be retained, it is
important to consider some of the undesirable consequences. In that
connection, the initial step is to determine how these regulations func-
tion in practice.
For the three periods 1945-49, 1951-55 and 1963-65, the SEC has
published statistical reports on the costs of issuing new securities.11'
These reports show that the total costs of public offerings in excess of
$1 million were well below limitations imposed by all the states
(Florida included)." 2 Thus expense limitations have not had, during
those periods, a detrimental effect upon the larger public offerings.
For the periods 1945-49, 1951-55 and 1963-65, however, the SEC studies
show that the average total costs of issues between $500,000 and $1
million were 18.3 percent, 21.8 percent and 14.6 percent, respectively.
For issues under $500,000, the studies indicate total costs of 24.1 per-
cent, 27.2 percent and 18.5 percent for the respective periods.
The significance of these statistics, in relation to blue sky regulation
generally and Florida law in particular, is clear. As the size of the issue
diminishes, average costs more closely approach state limitations. For
the smallest offerings ($500,000 or less), average total costs for the
periods 1945-49 and 1951-55 exceeded the current Florida standards
and the standards of all states in which there are published rules
limiting expenses. With respect to those issues ranging from $500,000
to $1 million, the average expenses in the 1951-55 period exceeded the
expense limitations in Florida as well as those in all other states in
which there are published rules.
The impact of such regulation on the costs of public offerings is
not fully illustrated by the statistics of the SEC study, since the SEC
computations of total expenses and underwriters' compensation do
not reflect an input for noncash compensation to underwriters in the
form of options, warrants or "cheap" stock (stock issued at a price sub-
111. SEC, PRIVATELY PLACED SECURITIES-COST OF FLOTATION 1945-49 (1951); SEC,
COST OF FLOTATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 1951-1955 (1957); SEC, Cost OF FLOTATION
OF REGISTERED EQUITY ISSUES 1963-1965 (1970).
112. See note 111 supra.
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stantially below the public offering price). Noncash compensation
was omitted from the SEC study because of the practical problems of
valuation. Most blue sky administrators, however, require that such
compensation be valued and included for purposes of determining
whether total expenses or underwriters' compensation exceed the pre-
scribed limits. 1" For example, the Florida rule arbitrarily values op-
tions or warrants to underwriters at 20 percent of the public offering
price of the securities to which they pertain. 1 14 Although there is no
published rule regarding "cheap" stock in Florida, some value must
be given to it to determine whether the expenses of offering securities
to the public in Florida exceed the 20 percent limitation.
Since the SEC study gives no information about the nature or
amount of noncash compensation that was paid during the periods
studied, it is impossible to determine with precision the specific in-
stances when inclusion of the value of such compensation caused total
expenses or underwriters' compensation to exceed the limits imposed
by Florida or any other state. Such compensation seldom, if ever, ap-
pears in connection with large issues by established firms. It is an ele-
ment of compensation associated with the distribution of small issues
by relatively small companies in the promotional stage. In fact, the
Florida rule limits the issuance of underwriters' options or warrants
to relatively small firms that are in the promotional stage.1 5 According-
ly, inclusion of the value of noncash compensation would be of signifi-
cance primarily in connection with issues of $1 million or less. For
such issues, especially those under $500,000, there were periods when
total expenses surpassed amounts that are currently permissible in
Florida.
It could be argued that even if total costs were computed after in-
cluding an appropriate amount for noncash compensation, such costs
still would not exceed the Florida limits in many instances. The basis
for that argument would be the evidence found in the SEC study that
the costs, expressed as a percentage of gross proceeds from offerings,
were less during 1963-65 than during 1951-55, and if that trend has
continued, costs might be less now than the maximum amounts per-
mitted in Florida. The SEC explained that trend in terms of funda-
mental changes that took place in the securities markets-for example,
greater appeal of equity securities relative to fixed income securities,
increased participation by institutions and proliferation of the number
of individual shareholders.'" Expansion of the market for common
113. See Mofsky, supra note 107, at 1018-19.
114. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 3B-106; 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. § 13,606 (Sept. 8, 1972).
115. Id.
116. See note 111 supra.
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stocks caused by those and other factors eased the marketing task, and
the risks associated with underwriting activity were thereby lessened.
In light of recent market developments, it is unwise blithely to as-
sume continuation of that trend and to conclude that there is probably
little present impact emanating from restrictions limiting costs of
offerings. The effects of current market conditions are extremely
severe. The extent to which losses occasioned by the 1969-70 and 1973
markets have restrained individuals from returning to common stock
investments in small companies is readily discernible by daily reading
of the financial sections of newspapers and by noting, among other
things, the small number of new issues, the low price-earnings ratio
for blue chip securities as well as speculative stocks and continued net
redemptions by mutual fund shareholders. Indeed, given market condi-
tions for equity securities during the past few years, there are strong
grounds for arguing that underwriting risks, especially those associated
with small issues by relatively small firms, have increased substantially
since 1968.
There are other arguments against assuming continuation of a
downward trend in the costs of a public offering. For example, while
it is true that for offerings exceeding $2 million the SEC studies show
successively lower percentages of total costs and underwriters' compen-
sation, it is also true that, with respect to smaller issues, both total
costs and underwriters' compensation increased from 1945-49 to 1951-
55, before decreasing during the 1963-65 period. The factors that
caused the upturn in 1951 may well be contributing to higher total
costs now than during 1963-65, especially with respect to smaller
issues. Furthermore, the SEC study shows successive increases in costs
other than underwriting compensation-4.5 percent for 1945-49, 6.2
percent for 1951-55 and 7.3 percent for 1963-65. This phenomenon is
explained by continuous increases in costs such as attorneys' fees, ac-
counting expenses, engineering fees and printing expenses. Everyone
associated with the public marketing of securities knows that those
costs have increased dramatically since 1963-65. Although increases
in non-underwriting costs were offset by drops in rates of underwriters'
compensation during the periods 1951-55 and 1963-65, one may serious-
ly question whether underwriters' compensation-particularly in the
case of small offerings-is now on the average less than it was in 1963-
65 or, assuming it has declined, whether it has decreased at a rate
sufficient to offset increases in other costs.
The SEC statistics show that percentage costs of offerings decline
as the size of issues increases. Several factors probably contribute to this
trend. First, there are certain minimal costs of an offering, for example,
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attorneys', accountants' and printers' fees that do not increase propor-
tionately with an enlargement of the issue size.' 1 7 Next, some under-
writers' costs for marketing an issue are relatively fixed and can be
spread over a larger dollar amount as the size of an issue increases."'
Most significant, however, is the fact that, as a general proposition,
first public offerings are relatively small and offerings by established
firms having an existing public market for their securities are generally
larger."" Thus, since there is usually greater underwriting risk in
connection with initial public offerings than with seasoned issues, it is
not surprising to find that the rate of underwriting compensation in-
creases as the issue size declines. Moreover, the evidence also indicates
a correlation between increased asset size of the issuer and decreased
underwriting costs expressed as a percentage of the offering." 0 This
phenomenon can probably be attributed to the fact that larger firms
have generally had a longer operating history than smaller ones, are
more likely to have an existing market for their securities and are
usually better known. The combination of these factors results in less
marketing risk for underwriters and lower rates of compensation.''
Consequently, the impact of expense limitation on the cost of
public offerings is most severe for small issuers, newly promoted
companies and other firms seeking to raise relatively small amounts of
capital. The costs of flotation for these firms are higher than the ex-
penses generally incurred by larger, more established enterprises. This
impact is entirely consistent with the concept of merit regulation-to
protect public investors when risks increase. But to view regulation of
the costs of offerings solely from the standpoint of presumed benefits
is to ignore resulting social costs that may be far greater than the bene-
fits attained.
Other merit standards in Florida are also geared to affect only
those newly promoted firms that attempt to raise capital publicly. The
sources of these standards are the statutory provisions that empower
the Division of Securities to deny or revoke registrations for a variety
of highly discretionary reasons. For example, the statute provides that
registration may be denied if the securities are offered on terms that
are unfair, unjust or inequitable."2 Additionally, registration may be
refused if the issuer's business is not based upon sound business






122. FLA. STAT. § 517.09 (1971); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 13,109 (June 19, 1973).
123. FLA. STAT. § 517.09 (1971); 1 BLUE SKY L. RP. ff 13,109 (June 19, 1975).
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In practice, however, it becomes extremely difficult to evaluate se-
curities in these broad terms. Assuming the percentage of equity to be
sold is held constant, there are at least two variables in any
speculative investment: the degree of risk involved and the price of
the stock. Inasmuch as neither of those is an independent variable, it
is impossible to determine the degree of risk that an investor should
be allowed to assume without, at the same time, determining the price
at which the securities could be sold. Accordingly, administrators in-
variably adopt devices that, in effect, set the prices at which issues
may be sold.
In Florida, these devices are found in the form of rules that set
specific quantitative limits to the dimensions indicated by the broad
statutory language. For example, in offerings where the issuer is in
the promotional or development phase, the offering will not be con-
sidered "fair, just, and equitable" unless the equity investment by
promoters or insiders is at least 15 percent of the "total equity invest-
ment resulting from the sale of the entire offering."112' An exception
to the 15 percent rule is permitted where the net worth of the issuer
is in excess of $100,000 and the offering is supported by the firm
commitment of an underwriter registered under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.125 That exception is of little benefit to firms i
the promotional stage, since reliable underwriters seldom give them
firm commitments. Moreover, the exception still requires a substantial
investment by the promoters ($100,000). That investment by insiders,
like the one required to meet the 15 percent standard, must be in
cash or tangible assets.12 6
The equity contribution requirement imposed on promoters di-
rectly limits the amount that can be raised publicly according to the
prescribed ratio. That limitation, in turn, effectively sets the price
at which securities are sold publicly. For example, assume that the
promoter is able to raise only $150,000 from private sources and that
he is unable to obtain a firm-commitment underwriting. He is thus
limited to a public offering of approximately $1,000,000. For his in-
vestment ($150,000 plus time, effort, ideas, know-how, etc.), he will
attempt to retain the largest equity position possible and still sell
the offering. He may, in fact, insist on absolute control. Assuming he
does, he will retain slightly more than 200,000 shares of common
stock, if, for example, 200,000 shares are sold to the public. According-
ly, the public offering price per share is set at $5. The price per share
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is thus a function of the Florida Division's equity contribution rule
combined with the percentage equity requirements of the promoter.
Although the policy for the 15 percent rule is not explained, it
may be assumed that one objective is to prevent the interests of outside
investors from being diluted beyond a stated point. Another objective
is to preclude promoters from raising public capital, unless they either
contribute substantial personal capital to the venture or raise a large
amount from private sources. Both theories imply that there is some
relationship between the amount of -capital contributed by outside
investors and the value of the promoter's or other insiders' invest-
ment. Such an assumption is unwarranted. A promoter's nontangible
innovation may be worth far more to a firm than a tangible contribu-
tion in cash. For example, one innovation ultimately may be worth
one thousand times the initial capital required to promote it, but an-
other innovation may be worth only ten percent of such capital.
Thus, in an attempt to quantify an objective standard of fairness,
the Division of Securities has only created an arbitrary rule that has
no relationship to the real values inherent in an innovation. In truth,
there is no way to establish an objective rule that quantifies such re-
lationships with respect to newly promoted firms. It is the precise func-
tion of the market to make these determinations. The costs of sub-
stituting market determination with arbitrary rules are, therefore,
more apparent.
Another question with respect to the promoter equity investment
rule quickly comes to mind. Why 15 percent? Experience with regu-
lators far more sophisticated than those who administer state securities
laws indicates that the administrators are no better able than anyone
else to evaluate the riskiness of a given venture. If they were, it is un-
likely that they would be administering the securities law rather than
maximizing their wealth in some more profitable way. To permit
state administrators to create rules that have no basis in logic or ex-
perience has the additional effect of causing members of the public
to be misled into believing that they are receiving protection that
may not exist.
For many years, the predecessor of the Division of Securities ad-
ministered an unpublished rule that limited the ratio between public
offering price and the amount paid per share by insiders for their stock.
Thus the public offering price could not exceed, for example, three
or four times the amount paid per share by promoters. This ratio was
never quantified in any rule. But combined with the promoter equity
investment (15 percent) rule, it had the clear effect of restricting the
amount of equity participation that promoters could take. A promoter
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might attempt to circumvent this informal rule by taking all the com-
mon voting stock for himself and selling only preferred or nonvoting
common stock, or debt securities to the public. However, the Division
of Securities divined that possibility and adopted rules precluding
the public sale of nonvoting common stock, preferred stock or debt
securities to finance a newly promoted venture.
12 7
The effect of these restrictions is to limit severely promoters' partic-
ipation and, in some instances, promoters' ability to raise capital
publicly and still retain control. If one assumes that promoters treat
control of their companies as an economic good and that the demand
for control is responsive to costs, then it must be true that some pro-
moters who would otherwise anticipate total revenues greater than
total costs now foresee a different picture. In other words, some
businesses may never be formed because of these restrictions, unless
there is another way to raise the requisite capital and still satisfy the
needs of promoters. The loss to society of those promotions may be
far greater than the benefits derived from this form of regulation. In-
deed, economic theory leads to this conclusion.
There are additional merit standards that also have severe effects
on new firms attempting to raise capital publicly. The escrow require-
ment for promoters' stock (if there is a substantial disparity between
the proposed offering price and the consideration paid by the promot-
er 1 2 or if securities are to be issued for intangible forms of considera-
tion 129) is another example. This latter restriction as well as the re-
maining merit standards have already been discussed fully by this
writer.30 Furthermore, a detailed scenario illustrating the ramifications
of merit regulation in a case history setting has been prepared by
this writer and published elsewhere.' 3'
The total net effect of this type of regulation is perhaps not con-
sciously recognized by participants in the industry. But large under-
writing firms are aware that the effect of regulation has been to elimi-
nate some competition in providing underwriting services. It is not
underwriters alone who benefit by protection from competition. An-
other group benefited by such regulation is comprised of the more
affluent members of the total business community. In certain instances,
promoters must necessarily shift control to those individuals in trans-
actions that would not take place in the absence of the described merit
127. FLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3B-1.05-.09; 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 13,605-09 (Sept. 8,
1972).
128. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 3B-1.15; 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 13,615 (Sept. 8, 1972).
129. FLA. STAT. § 517.18 (Supp. 1972); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. U 13,118 (Sept. 18, 1972).
130. See J. MOFSKY, supra note 10.
131. See id. at 41-57.
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standards applicable to public offerings. Control may be shifted to
such persons by outright sale of an innovation or idea or, indirectly,
by sale to them of a very large or absolute majority interest in a pri-
vately financed firm. The Florida private placement exemption con-
tains severe restrictions on the number of persons to whom securities
may be sold absent registration.1 32 As the number of private placees di-
minishes, the amount that each contributes will increase, and that in-
crease will normally be accompanied by greater demands for control,
since each investor will have a larger interest to protect.
The cost to promoters of that shift in control in the private place-
ment situation may be greater than the benefits they would derive,
just as the costs occasioned by the promoter equity investment rule
in connection with public offerings may exceed the contemplated
benefits. If that is so, the firm will not come into existence, since
other sources for capital are generally not feasible for new promo-
tions. 133 The anticompetitive effects of the blue sky laws are again
confirmed, and it is unnecessary to discuss other merit restrictions,
such as those relating to real estate investment trusts and limited part-
nerships, which generate similar consequences. For these reasons, it is
recommended that merit standards be eliminated from the Florida
securities law.
VII. REGULATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS
Florida securities law requires registration of broker-dealers,
securities salesmen and investment advisers.134 It also establishes finan-
cial responsibility, examination and other standards designed to pro-
tect customers of those persons. 35 The standards of the SEC, the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, and the Securities Investors
Protection Corporation, in many instances, overlalg with those of
Florida. 13 6 Furthermore, the standards of and surveillance by those or-
ganizations are generally more stringent and comprehensive than those
of Florida.13 7 Accordingly, it seems highly inefficient for Florida to
impose its rules in an area already being heavily regulated. Therefore,
132. FLA. STAT. § 517.06(10) (1971); Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-68, § 2 (§ 517.06(11));
I BLUE SKY L. REP. f 13,106 (June 19, 1973).
133. See J. MOFSKY, supra note 10, at 19.
134. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-68, § 3 (§ 517.12); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. g 13,112 (June
19, 1973).
135. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-68, § 3 (§ 517.12); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. ff 13,112 (June
19, 1973).
136. Hearings on the Federal Paperwork Burden (Securities Broker-Dealer Re-
quirements) Before the Subcomm. on Government Regulation of the Senate Select




the elimination of broker-dealer, securities salesmen and investment
adviser regulation (when those persons are already regulated by an-
other agency) is recommended. If the number of Florida dealers, sales-
men and investment advisers not regulated by a non-state agency is
relatively small, their regulation by the state should be eliminated as
well, since the cost of enforcement for a small number of persons
would probably be far greater than the benefits created. 3
Elimination of regulation in this area would have the desirable
effect of lowering costs of operation for securities dealers. That, in
turn, would make the securities business more profitable. To the ex-
tent that elimination of controls in Florida would have that effect,
perhaps more new brokerage firms would be formed and fewer firms
driven out of business. There is a paucity of small securities dealers
in Florida. They have traditionally made an extremely important
contribution to the economy by servicing small investors and assisting
small and new ventures in raising capital. 3 9 These considerations far
outweigh any benefits accruing from regulation, especially when a
firm is already regulated by some other agency.'
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
There are several possible approaches that may be taken to reform
the Florida securities laws. It would, for example, be possible to
analyze each provision of the existing statute and rules with a view
to resolving ambiguities and revising areas of technical deficiency. If
that would achieve the best possible result, the tedium of the task
would warrant its undertaking. However, such law reform does not
focus on the policy issues underlying the laws, and, it is submitted,
policy analysis and formulation should be the key to reform of the
securities laws. Similarly, a strict comparative approach designed to
create uniformity would detract from analysis of the fundamental
issues. Accordingly, a technical examination of the statutory and rule
provisions has not been pursued. Instead, an attempt has been made
to present the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence against
the laws as they are presently constituted. Moreover, an effort has been
made to demonstrate that such arguments and evidence strongly sug-
gest the need for fundamental reform of the philosophy underlying
securities regulation in Florida.
138. This writer does not know the number of such dealers, salesmen and in-
vestment advisers, since there is no published list in Florida. It is presumed that the
information can be readily supplied by the Florida Division of Securities.
139. See Hearings, supra note 136, at 1550-78.
140. Id.
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The main recommendations made in this article are the total
elimination of merit standards, elimination of registration of those
securities that are registered federally (under either the 1933 or 1934
Act) and the partial elimination of broker-dealer regulation. There
should also be retention of a strong antifraud law with a staff to en-
force it. Additionally, private placement exemptions should be liberal-
ized. Implementation of these recommendations could be accomplished
readily. If Florida is to generate more business and is to encourage
firms to raise capital more efficiently, the state must be willing to take
some pioneering steps. If the legislature should enact new laws based
on these recommendations, empirical study can be done after a suf-
ficient period of time to determine whether the changes have been
beneficial. If not, the law can be changed again. In the meantime,
analysis supports the arguments for basic reform. This analysis does
not indicate that important safeguards would be sacrificed.
